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CORPORATE RECORD-KEEPERS AND THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: AN EQUITABLE
APPROACH TO FIFTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
The privilege against self-incrimination reflects many of our
most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those ac-
cused of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury,
or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an
inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incrim-
inating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and
abuses; our sense of fair play .. . ; our respect for ... the
right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead
a private life."'
I. INTRODUCTION
It has long been established that the fifth amendment' right
against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from
both compelled production of his personal papers and compelled oral
testimony.- However, fifth amendment protection has traditionally
been denied to individuals who are employed by corporations as cus-
todians of corporate records. The theory that individuals waive their
fifth amendment rights with respect to corporate employment results
in inconsistent treatment of similarly situated individuals.
Consider, for example, a situation in which there are two small
retail appliance stores. Each store is operated solely by its owner,
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1. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'r., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (citations omitted). See also
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251, at 295-318 (1961). Under an inquisitorial criminal justice
system the government may interrogate the accused in order to establish its case against him.
Under an accusatorial system such interrogation, even under judicial safeguards, is forbidden.
The government must carry the burden of proving its charge against the accused by evidence
independently obtained through investigations. Id. at 295 n.l.
2. "No person ...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-35 (1886). See generally Note, In re Doe:
Required Records and the Fifth Amendment, 16 CONN. L. REV. 1021, 1022 n.11 (1984)
[hereinafter Note, In re Doe]; Note, On Claiming the Fifth Amendment for Mixed Purpose
Documents: The Problem of Categorizing Documents as Personal or Corporate in a Business
Setting, 17 U.S.F.L. REV. 333, 335 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Mixed Purpose Documents].
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who also prepares the store's accounting records. The only difference
between the stores is that one is a sole proprietorship, 4 while the
other is a corporation8 with its owner serving as corporate president.
A grand jury investigating each store issues a subpoena to each
owner ordering the surrender of certain accounting records. Under
traditional law, the sole proprietor is entitled to avoid producing the
records by claiming the surrender of such documents would person-
ally incriminate him. The corporate president, however, may not
invoke his personal right against self-incrimination because he is act-
ing as an agent of the corporation, which has no fifth amendment
rights.
This hypothetical demonstrates the conflict between the govern-
ment's interest in regulating economic entities (such as corporations)
and the constitutional rights of the individuals who operate those en-
tities.' This conflict has resulted in two prevailing approaches for
determining whether or not the right against self-incrimination may
be invoked in the business context. The traditional collective entity
approach' denies fifth amendment protection based on an individ-
ual's status as a corporate record-keeper. In contrast, the testimonial
communications approach8 looks to the potentially incriminating im-
4. A sole proprietorship is a form of business which is owned by one person. The sole
owner has full authority and responsibility for all business decisions, owns all property as an
individual, assumes unlimited liability for all debts of the business, and is taxed as an individ-
ual. 1 Z. CAVITCH, BusINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 1.01 (1984).
5. A corporation is legal entity, created by law, for carrying on a business separate and
distinct from its owners or investors. The corporate form allows the owners to limit their
individual liability to their investment in the enterprise. I CORPORATION EXPLANATION 1102
(Prentiss Hall) (1985). Corporations are legal persons capable of conducting business in the
same manner as "natural" persons: they can own assets, enter contracts, incur liabilities, sue
and be sued. The four distinguishing characteristics of corporations are continuity of life, sepa-
ration of ownership and control, limited liability, and free transferability of interest. Trustees
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 636 (1819). See 1 Z. CAVITCH, supra
note 4, at § 1.01.
6. A corporate crime investigation may place the custodian of subpoenaed documents
and the corporation in an adversarial position. Corporate crime typically involves concerted
action of corporate officials, and the corporation may benefit from cooperating with the prose-
cution, to the detriment of corporate employees. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
In Wilson, a corporate president was personally subpoenaed to surrender corporate documents
that would incriminate him. The president had been charged with a crime which was evi-
denced by the subpoenaed records. The corporation was willing to surrender the records and
the president attempted to invoke his personal fifth amendment rights. Id. at 385 (McKenna,
J., dissenting).
7. The term "collective entities" includes: partnerships, Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S.
85 (1974); corporations, Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); unincorporated associa-
tions, United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); and labor unions, Curcio v. United States,
354 U.S. 118 (1957). See infra text accompanying notes 66-70.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 88-120.
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pact that a compelled disclosure could have on the individual who is
subject to compulsion. Consequently, the fifth amendment rights of
records custodians have been inconsistently interpreted by the courts.
This comment examines the fifth amendment treatment of individu-
als acting as record-keepers of various business entities, and proposes
that fifth amendment protection be equally available to all business
record custodians.
II. THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The privilege against self-incrimination requires the govern-
ment to prove a criminal case against the defendant without forcing
the accused to act as a witness against himself.' The privilege pro-
tects only communications,1° and may be invoked by any witness
who is asked to produce information against his will, whether the
proceeding is a trial, a grand jury hearing, or a hearing before an
investigative body. 1
The language of the fifth amendment defines the scope of its
application. The right against self-incrimination may be asserted
only when a person is compelled to incriminate himself." Each of
these elements must be present in order to assert the privilege." This
section describes the elements which trigger fifth amendment protec-
tion and discusses the exceptions to the right to assert the privilege
against self-incrimination.
A. Fifth Amendment Elements
1. A Person
The right against self-incrimination has historically been
viewed as a purely personal one which adheres to the individual, not
to the documents requested or their allegedly incriminating con-
tents."' The privilege is available only to "natural" individuals and
9. Wilson, 221 U.S. at 385; White, 322 U.S. at 698.
10. See, e.g., Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634-35 (which held that the fifth amendment protects
the contents of documents, if the contents are private. Boyd has never been expressly over-
ruled); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910) (forcing a prisoner to try on a shirt
did not constitute physical or moral compulsion to extort communications - the fifth amend-
ment does not protect the accused's body when it may be material evidence).
11. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972).
12. See supra note 2.
13. See Note, Business Records and the Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimi-
nation, 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 351, 361 (1977).
14. Hale v. Henkle, 201 U.S. 43, 69 (1906); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328(1973). See also Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633-34 (forcing an individual to produce private papers
1987]
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does not protect "legal persons.""5 Judicial determination of whether
a business entity is a natural rather than legal person is critical to
the availability of fifth amendment rights.
Courts have generally classified sole proprietorships 6 as natural
persons with the right to assert fifth amendment protection,' 7 but
have held that other business entities such as partnerships'" and cor-
porations 9 are not entitled to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination. 0 This classification is supported by the theory that a
sole proprietorship is so personal in nature as to embody the purely
private interests of its owner.21 In contrast, legal persons have a rec-
ognizable legal existence apart from that of their individual
members; thus the entity itself cannot claim the right against self-
incrimination."" The effect of this theory is that an individual acting
in his capacity as business officer, employee or record-keeper of a
legal entity, cannot assert the privilege to protect either the entity,
himself, or a fellow employee from compelled incrimination.3
would force him to testify to his private thoughts); Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457,
458 (1913) (production of documents by a third person in a different context did not compel
the accused to be a witness against himself); White, 322 U.S. at 699 ("the papers and effects
which the privilege protects must be the private property of the person claiming the privilege,
or at least in his possession in a purely private capacity").
15. A natural person is a human being. A legal person may be a corporation, labor
organization, partnership, or association, which by statute is treated as having many of the
same rights as a natural person. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1028 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). See
White, 322 U.S. at 699-700; Bellis, 417 U.S. at 88. See also Wilson, 221 U.S. at 377 (a
corporate officer cannot rely on the fifth amendment to justify refusal to produce subpoenaed
records); Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911) (subpoena directed at individual corpo-
rate officer to produce corporate records upheld); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630, 638 (privilege applies
to business records of a sole proprietor and to personal documents containing more intimate
information about the individual's private life).
16. See supra note 4.
17. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617, 630; Couch, 409 U.S. at 322; Bellis, 417 U.S. at 88.
18. A partnership is an association between two or more persons to carry on, as co-
owners, a business for profit. The two outstanding features of a general partnership are unlim-
ited liability of each member for all debts of the business and implied authority of each mem-
ber to bind the firm as to outsiders by any act within the normal scope of the particular
business. Partnerships are not subject to taxation. Partnership income, gains and losses are
reported by the partners on their personal tax returns. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 6(1),
9(1), 15 (1914).
19. See supra note 5.
20. The fifth amendment protects only natural persons. See supra note 15.
21. White, 322 U.S. at 701. See generally L. TAYLOR, WITNFss IMMUNITY 102 (1983).
22. White, 322 U.S. at 701.
23. Hale, 201 U.S. at 57-58, 69-70 (Secretary-Treasurer of a corporation was subpoe-
naed to testify and produce corporate records in a grand jury antitrust hearing); Couch, 409
U.S. at 328;Johnson, 228 U.S. at 458 ("A party is privileged from producing evidence but not
from its production."); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976).
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2. Compulsion
The creation or surrender of incriminating documents must be
effected by some type of compulsion;2" the fifth amendment does not
protect the voluntary creation or surrender of such records. 8 Typi-
cally, compulsion results from the government's regulatory or law
enforcement interests. Governmental compulsion may take the form
of a subpoena duces tecum, 6 a search warrant,2 7 or an administra-
tive summons.2 ' Compulsion may be directed at parties to civil or
criminal litigation, non-party witnesses who are deposed or asked to
testify in such cases, and parties in possession of documents pertain-
ing to a grand jury inquiry. 9
Only a person who is compelled to be a witness against himself,
24. Compulsion means to force an unwilling party to act as a source of evidence. Gouled
v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921). See generally Note, supra note 13, at 364-68;
Note, Mixed Purpose Documents, supra note 3, at 342-44; Project, White Collar Crime: Sur-
vey of Law-1982 Update, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 291, 297-99 (1982) [hereinafter Project,
1982 Update]; Note, Abolition of Fifth Amendment Protection for the Contents of Pre-ex-
isting Documents: U.S. v. Doe, 38 Sw. L.J. 1023 (1984) [hereinafter Note, U.S. v. Doe].
25. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473-74 (1976); Note, supra note 13, at 365-
66. See also United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). "Where the preparation of business
records is voluntary no compulsion is present." Id. at 610.
26. A subpoena duces tecum commands "the person to whom it is directed to produce
the books, papers, documents or other objects [identified] therein." FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
Although probable cause is not a prerequisite for obtaining a subpoena, the items to be pro-
duced must be described with particularity in order for a subpoena to issue. Id. For a detailed
discussion of the subpoena duces tecum, see Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the
Subpoena Duces Tecum: The Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, 95 HARV. L. REV. 683
(1982).
27. A search warrant is a written order authorizing the search and seizure of any prop-
erty that constitutes evidence of a crime. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1). "No warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause supported by oath, affirmation, and particularity describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See Andresen,
427 U.S. at 473-74, which addressed the issue of whether a search warrant could be used to
reach business records which are immune from subpoena due to the fifth amendment. The
Supreme Court stated that although compliance with a subpoena may constitute a compulsory
authentication of incriminating information which warrants fifth amendment protection, "a
seizure of the same material by law enforcement officers differs in a crucial respect - the
individual against whom the search is directed is not required to aid in the discovery, produc-
tion, or authentication of incriminating evidence." Id.
28. An administrative summons is an administrative agency's equivalent to a subpoena
duces tecum or documentary subpoena. For a thorough discussion of the administrative sum-
mons, see Wilson & Matz, Obtaining Evidence for Federal Economic Crime Prosecutions: An
Overview and Analysis of Investigative Methods, 14 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 651, 653-83 (1977);
Project, White Collar Crime: A Survey of Law, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 169 (1980) [hereinafter
Project, Survey of Law]; see also Project, 1982 Update, supra note 24, at 297.
29. Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents - Cutting Fisher's Tan-
gled Line, 49 Mo. L. REv. 439, 487 (1984).
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or to perform some assertive act, can claim the privilege.30 A person
who is potentially incriminated by the disclosure of requested infor-
mation cannot assert the privilege on the basis of compulsion directed
at a party who has possession of the documents. The fifth amend-
ment privilege is only available when compulsion threatens to cause
self-incrimination.
3. Self-Incrimination
Self-incrimination results when the subpoenant is compelled to
produce evidence which could lead to the discovery of his own crimi-
nal conduct."1 Consequently, production of such evidence by anyone
other than the subpoenant does not constitute self-incrimination and
cannot be used to invoke fifth amendment protection. 32 Evidence in-
criminates a person if it is direct proof of his criminal conduct or
provides a link in the chain of evidence needed to establish his
crime."3 Incriminating evidence may take the form of either oral
statements or physical evidence such as documents."' A person is en-
titled to assert the fifth amendment in order to avoid production of
requested evidence if a mere threat of self-incrimination exists.33
The standard for determining if the production of evidence has
sufficient incriminating potential to justify a fifth amendment claim
was established in Hoffman v. United States."' In that case, the Su-
preme Court held that the fifth amendment may be invoked if there
is "reasonable cause to apprehend danger" of self-incrimination from
30. See supra note 24. Assertive conduct is an act intended as a substitute for oral or
written verbal expression. See Arenella, Schmerber and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion: A Reappraisal, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 31, 42-43 (1982).
31. Heidt, supra note 29, at 477.
32. See supra note 23. For present purposes, this comment will generally refer to the
subject of any government compulsion as "the subpoenant."
33. Id. See also Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (petitioner charged
with being a known underworld character and racketeer with a 20 year police record refused
to answer questions about his present occupation, connections and knowledge of the wherea-
bouts of a fugitive witness).
34. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633. The Boyd Court extended the fifth amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination to protect the individual from compelled production of
documents as well as from compelled oral testimony. See Heidt, supra note 29, at 477.
35. Note, U.S. v. Doe, supra note 24, at 1024. See generally C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE § 14.04, at 261-63 (1980).
36. 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Glanzer, Schiffman & Packman, The Use of the Fifth Amend-
ment in SEC Investigations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 895, 909-11 (1984) [hereinafter
Glanzer]. Cf United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980), where the Court stated the
threat must be "substantial and 'real,' and not merely trifling or imaginary .. " See Note,
Fifth Amendment Limitations on Compelled Production of Evidence, 22 Am. CRIM. L. REV.
559, 562 nn.2363-69 (1984).
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compliance with the government's request for evidence.3 7 The ques-
tion of whether providing the requested information could incrimi-
nate a witness must be decided by the court.38
Courts have difficulty assessing the incriminating impact of
compelled disclosures because the judge is often unfamiliar with the
status of an investigation and the nature of the evidence accumulated
by the prosecution." For example, in private civil cases, the court
must decide if requested information is potentially incriminating be-
cause the government may subsequently bring a criminal action
against the parties.' In criminal cases, the court must evaluate pos-
sible incrimination when the prosecution does not know what docu-
ments the subpoenant is suppressing."'
Consequently, the court has no knowledge of the incriminating
impact of the witness' compelled statement or action.' "Even if the
government [could identify the documents in existence], the investi-
gation is likely to be at such an early stage that the prosecutors will
not know which offenses may be prosecuted or whether . . .evi-
dence subsequently discovered will render [presently incriminating
information] a 'foregone conclusion.' "' However, this lack of infor-
37. See supra notes 33 & 36. The test is not whether the witness will be prosecuted, but
whether he could be prosecuted. Pillsbury v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248 (1983).
38. The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares
that in doing so he would incriminate himself - his [assertion] does not of itself
establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his si-lence is justified, and to require him to answer if "it clearly appears" to the
court that he is mistaken.
Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 (citations omitted). See generally Glanzer, supra note 36, at 909-
11.
39. Glanzer, supra note 36, at 912.
40. Pillsbury, 459 U.S. at 261. In Pillsbury, the Court held that a witness who testifiedbefore a grand jury under a grant of use immunity could invoke the fifth amendment at a
subsequent civil deposition to avoid responding to questions taken from the transcript of hisprior immunized testimony. The witness was entitled to protection against: 1) repeating hisprior testimony or adopting his immunized answer; 2) affirming the accuracy of the transcript
of his prior immunized testimony; 3) recalling additional information responsive to the ques-tion but not disclosed in his immunized testimony; or 4) disclosing information not responsive
to the question. Id. See also Heidt, supra note 29, at 482.
41. Pillsbury, 459 U.S. at 261. See, e.g., Glanzer, supra note 36, at 908 n.126. Prosecu-
tors frequently issue broad subpoenas in the hope of obtaining evidence which is not known to
exist. "The most plausible inference to be drawn from ... broad-sweeping subpoenas is thatthe Government, unable to prove that the subpoenaed documents exist . . . is attempting to
compensate for its lack of knowledge by requiring the [accused] to become, in effect, the pri-
mary informant against himself." In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 680 F.2d
327, 335 (3d Cir. 1982), aff d on this point sub nom., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 613(1984).
42. Glanzer, supra note 36, at 912.
43. Heidt, supra note 29, at 482. See Doe, 465 U.S. at 614 n.13.
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mation may be remedied by either an in camera hearing,44 where
the witness must explain his basis for asserting the privilege, or
through a grant of "use immunity.""'
B. Exceptions to Fifth Amendment Protection
1. Use Immunity
Use immunity removes the threat of incrimination by forbidding
the government's use of immunized testimony and related evidence
against the witness in a subsequent criminal proceeding. 48 "[Miany
offenses are of such a character that the only persons capable of giv-
ing useful testimony are those implicated in the crime.""' Use immu-
nity allows the state to compel the production of evidence from one
participant in a criminal activity in order to convict his accom-
plices.4S Immunity must be granted only where the potential witness
has a legitimate fifth amendment claim,"9 and need not be granted if
production of the required evidence does not threaten to incriminate
the witness. Although immunized information cannot be used against
the witness, prosecution is not completely barred.5" The prosecution
44. Glanzer, supra note 36, at 912. An issue is heard in camera either when the hear-
ing is before the judge in his private chambers or when all spectators are excluded from the
courtroom. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 684. The judge assesses the poten-
tial for incrimination and orders production of the evidence if no real threat of self-incrimina-
tion exists. United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079, 1081 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1099 (1984).
45. See, e.g., Curcio, 354 U.S. at 124. An individual "cannot be lawfully compelled, in
absence of a grant of adequate immunity from prosecution, to condemn himself by his own
oral testimony." Id. Use immunity was intended to immunize and exclude from a subsequent
criminal trial only that information to which the government has expressly surrendered future
use. Pillsbury, 459 U.S. at 260.
46. Note, U.S. v. Doe, supra note 24, at 1034 n.93. Protection from prosecution must be
commensurate with the privilege against self-incrimination, but it need not be any greater.
Thus, a witness is entitled only to protection from prosecution based on the use and derivative
use of his testimony; he is not constitutionally entitled to protection from prosecution for of-
fenses arising from the illegal transaction which his testimony concerns. See Pillsbury, 459
U.S. at 254-55; Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462.
47. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 446. Offenses which may not be proved practically without
immunity include political bribery, extortion, consumer fraud, commercial larceny and various
forms of racketeering. Id. at 447 n.15.
48. Note, supra note 13, at 372. The purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 6002 was to limit the
scope of immunity to the level that is constitutionally required, as well as to limit immunity to
those cases in which the Attorney General, or officials designated by him, determine that gain-
ing the witness' testimony outweighs the opportunity for criminal prosecution of that witness.
Pillsbury, 459 U.S. at 254. See infra note 53 for text of section 6002.
49. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462; United States v. Frumento, 552 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1977).
50. Note, supra note 13, at 372-73. This is in contrast to a state's grant of transactional
immunity, which accords full immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the com-
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can still proceed against the individual who was granted immunity if
the prosecutor can establish his case using evidence completely inde-
pendent of the immunized information.5"
Since prosecution of a witness who is compelled to produce evi-
dence may be prevented, the court may grant use immunity only
with the prosecutor's approval. 2 The federal immunity statutes5"
provide that a prosecuting United States Attorney may request an
order compelling testimony or the surrender of evidence if an indi-
pelled testimony relates and is considered to afford the witness considerably broader protection
than does the fifth amendment. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453. See Note, U.S. v. Doe, supra note
24, at 1034 n.93.
In 1970 Congress made the scope of immunity less expansive by repealing authorization
for transactional immunity. The major purpose for the repeal was to provide the criminaljustice system with the necessary legal tools to strengthen the evidence gathering process and
insure the evidence will then be available and admissible at trial. Pillsbury, 459 U.S. at 253(quoting 116 CONe;. REC€. 35200 (1970) (statement of Rep. St. Germain)).
51. Note, supra note 13, at 372-73. See Pillsbury, 459 U.S. at 255; Kastigar, 406 U.S.
at 460.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (1970).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-in-
crimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or
ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, or a joint committee of the two Houses, or a
committee or subcommittee of either House, and the person presiding over theproceeding communicates an order issued under this part [18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-
031, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information com-
pelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from
such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any
criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or oth-
erwise failing to comply with the order.
18 U.S.C. § 6003 provides:
(a) In the case of an individual who had been or may be compelled to
provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the
United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district
court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall
issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, an order requiring such
individual to give testimony or provide other information which he refuses to
give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, such or-
der to become effective as provided in section 6002 of this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney Gen-
eral, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his
judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be neces-
sary to the public interest, and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
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vidual refuses to provide such information based upon his right
against self-incrimination. 54 The prosecutor is entitled to request an
order to compel when he believes the testimony or information may
be necessary to the public interest.5 When an order to compel is
issued, the witness must surrender the required evidence. Informa-
tion compelled under the order may not be used against the witness
in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury." Thus, use
immunity resolves policy conflicts between the fifth amendment and
the government's duty to protect public interests.
2. The Required Records Exception
As with use immunity, the required records exception enables
the government to obtain evidence despite a valid fifth amendment
claim. The required records rule allows the government to compel a
person to submit records he was statutorily required to keep.5" The
fifth amendment may not be invoked when the requested documents:
1) are required to be kept for regulatory purposes; 2) are of a type
normally kept by the witness; and 3) are of a type customarily kept
by the general public. 8 This exception has given rise to the concern
that the government might be allowed to exercise its regulatory
power to nullify an individual's fifth amendment protection merely
54. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03 (1970).
55. Id. at § 6003(b)(1). Societal interests which may conflict with the fifth amendment
include the need to prosecute criminals, to protect the civil interests of the victims, to enforce
public laws and to collect tax revenues. See Note, supra note 13, at 372-73; Couch, 409 U.S.
at 336.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 6002(3) (1970).
57. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). Petitioner, a produce wholesaler, was
subpoenaed to produce sale and inventory records prepared under the Price Control Act. Crea-
tion of the records was for regulatory purposes, and petitioner was not entitled to invoke his
fifth amendment privilege. See also United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984). In Schlansky, a taxpayer was directed by an IRS sum-
mons to produce financial records. After inspecting the records in camera, the magistrate
found that the taxpayer had no fifth amendment privilege because the requested records were
voluntarily created. The fact that the content of such pre-existing documents might be incrimi-
nating did not create the privilege to withhold them. Id.
58. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); L. TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 106.
See, e.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971) (at petitioner's trial for tax evasion,
the government used monthly wagering tax forms filed by petitioner pursuant to statute); In re
Doe, 711 F.2d 1187, 1191 (2d Cir. 1983) (employer's W-2 and Form 1099 are required
documents for tax purposes); United States v. McCoy, 492 F. Supp. 540, 544 (M.D. Fla.
1980) (records required to be kept by licensed customshouse broker for public regulatory pur-
poses are exempt for fifth amendment purposes); United States v. Le Page, 441 F. Supp. 824,
826-27 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (regulations regarding cattle sales records aid public interests by
helping control disease among domestic animals).
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by requiring records to be kept.8" However, there are limits to gov-
ernmental regulatory powers. The government may not impose doc-
umentation requirements unless the required records relate to public
activities in which the state has a valid regulatory interest.60
III. THEORIES OF FIFTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
Although the policies reflected by the fifth amendment have re-
mained constant since the amendment's adoption, the elements of a
fifth amendment claim have been defined by changing social needs.
The interpretation of these elements is presently in a state of transi-
tion. This section traces the evolution and application of modern
theories of fifth amendment protection in the business context.
A. The Private Content Rule
Application of the right against self-incrimination in the context
of business documents was first considered in Boyd v. United
States." The Boyd Court held that the fifth amendment is violated if
the government intrudes on personal privacy by compelling a person
to testify or surrender private papers for use as evidence to convict
him of a crime.62 "[Ilt is the invasion of [a person's] indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property"
that constitutes the essence of the offense which violates the right
against self-incrimination."' Thus, under the Boyd test, the availabil-
ity of fifth amendment protection turns on whether or not the
contents of requested documents are private.
The Boyd "content rule" has been extended to afford fifth
amendment protection in the business context. Two dominant theo-
ries of fifth amendment protection have evolved with respect to
business documents: 1) the traditional "collective entity" ' theory
which provides that record-keepers may not assert their personal
fifth amendment rights to shield the documents of collective entities,
59. Shapiro, 335 U.S. at 53-54 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
60. See supra note 55. See also Note, In re Doe, supra note 3, at 1027.
61. 116 U.S. 630 (1886). Boyd involved a civil forfeiture proceeding by the government
against two partners for fraudulently attempting to import glass without paying the prescribed
import duty. The government obtained a court order directing the partners to produce a part-
nership invoice for a prior shipment.
62. Id. at 634-35. See generally Note, In re Doe, supra note 3, at 1022 n.l; Note,
Mixed Purpose Documents, supra note 3, at 333.
63. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
64. See supra note 7. See infra text accompanying notes 66-70.
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and 2) the more recently developed "testimonial communications""
theory that a records custodian may invoke the fifth amendment if
production of the requested evidence constitutes a testimonial com-
munication which tends to incriminate him.
B. The Collective Entity Rule
1. Collective Entity Rationale
Under the collective entity rule, the question of whether fifth
amendment protection may be invoiced depends upon the type of en-
tity involved." The collective entity rule denies fifth amendment
protection to entities created by law, but affords protection to indi-
viduals and non-collective entities. 7 The rationale for this treatment
is twofold. First, since legal entities exist by virtue of state law and
affect public interests, the state retains power to investigate the activ-
ities of these statutory entities to ensure they are operating within
the law." The state government has a duty to regulate legal organi-
zations to protect public interests. Secondly, and more importantly,
the primary purpose of the fifth amendment is to preserve the per-
sonal privacy interests of individuals.6 9 The guarantee against com-
pulsory self-disclosure is aimed primarily at protecting civil liberties
and is not intended to protect economic interests so as to nullify gov-
ernment regulation of such interests."'
The collective entity rationale was reaffirmed in Bellis v.
United States.7 1 The Bellis Court explained that most evidence of
wrongdoing by a collective entity or its representatives is usually
found in the official records and documents of that organization.
72
Extending fifth amendment protection to these impersonal records
would make effective enforcement of legitimate government regula-
tions impossible 7  because an artificial entity can act only through its
65. See infra text accompanying notes 88-120.
66. See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
67. Id. For example, natural persons or sole proprietorships are entitled to fifth amend-
ment protection under the collective entity rule.
68. Wilson, 221 U.S. at 382-85.
69. Id.; Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630; Couch, 409 U.S. at 333.
70. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1974) (citing White, 322 U.S. at 700).
71. 417 U.S. 85 (1974). Bellis held that a partner of a subsequently dissolved law firm
could not invoke the fifth amendment in refusing to produce the partnership's financial records
because the partnership had an institutional identity and the petitioner held the records in a
representative, not a personal, capacity. The Bellis opinion reiterated Boyd's holding that the
privilege protects the personal and business papers of the individual. Id. at 87-89.
72. Id. at 91 (citing Wilson, 221 U.S. at 384-85).
73. 417 U.S. at 91.
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agents. 4 Consequently, the only way to prevent the entity from
shielding its records is to prevent its individual representatives from
invoking their personal fifth amendment rights with respect to those
records.78 Allowing a records custodian to assert fifth amendment
protection would extend the privilege to the organization and shield
the collective entity from governmental scrutiny. 6
2. The Rights of Collective Entity Record-Keepers
The Bellis Court reasoned that the privilege against self-incrim-
ination should be "limited to its historic function of protecting only
the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his
own testimony or personal records. '7 7 The Court noted that "indi-
viduals, when acting as representatives of a collective group, cannot
be said to be exercising their purely personal privileges. '78 Instead,
"individuals, assume the rights, privileges, duties and obligations of
the artificial entity or association of which they are agents or
officers. "1
7 9
Accordingly, an individual forfeits his personal rights with re-
spect to his employment as a collective entity agent. The general rule
is that an individual cannot assert the privilege to avoid production
of an organization's records if he is acting as a representative of the
entity."0 This restriction is based upon the strong privacy theme un-
derlying the collective entity rule. Since "[c]orporate records do not
contain the requisite element of privacy or confidentiality essential
for the privilege to attach,"'" neither the corporation nor the entity's
record-keeper can invoke the fifth amendment to avoid producing
requested documents.' Moreover, a corporate representative must
surrender subpoenaed corporate documents in his custody, even if he
is a sole practitioner and the records contain information which
would incriminate him personally.8"
The custodian does, however, retain a personal fifth amendment
74. Id. at 90 (citing White, 322 U.S. at 699).
75. 417 U.S. at 90.
76. Id. (citing White, 322 U.S. at 701).
77. 417 U.S. at 90 (quoting White, 322 U.S. at 699).
78. 417 U.S. at 90.
79. Id.
80. White, 322 U.S. at 699-700.
81. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 92. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
82. White, 322 U.S. at 699-700; Bellis, 417 U.S. at 89-90.
83. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100-01. The privilege applies only to the papers of an individual
or the business records of a sole proprietor. Id. at 87-88.
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privilege to refuse to orally authenticate subpoenaed documents"' or
testify about the reasons for non-production of corporate records.8" A
custodian "cannot lawfully be compelled, in the absence of a grant of
adequate immunity from prosecution, to condemn himself by his
own oral testimony. '"" By accepting custodianship of records he for-
feits his claim of privilege only with respect to the production of the
records.
87
Thus, under the collective entity rule, the question of fifth
amendment protection turns on the form of entity and the nature of
evidence requested, without regard to the personal rights of the en-
tity's employees. In contrast, the testimonial communications rule
disregards the form of entity and nature of evidence and focuses on
the impact that the order to compel will have on an individual
employee.
C. The Testimonial Communications Rule
1. The Assertion Requirement
The testimonial communications theory of fifth amendment
protection has its roots in the landmark case of Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia.88 The Schmerber Court held that the privilege "protects an
accused from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise
provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative
nature. . . ."" Under the Schmerber test, a records custodian may
assert the fifth amendment privilege on the basis of the communica-
tive nature of the allegedly incriminating disclosure sought to be
84. Id. at 87. In situations where authentication is required, the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence indicate that the requirement can be satisfied by the submission of "sufficient evidence
supporting a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims." FED. R. EVID.
901(a).
85. Curcio, 354 U.S. at 123-25. Curcio held that the act of producing evidence in re-
sponse to a subpoena constitutes compulsion because compliance with a subpoena tacitly con-
cedes the existence of the papers demanded, their possession, and that the records surrendered
were those requested. Id. at 125. Disclosing the reasons for non-production would have the
same effect as compliance with the subpoena. Thus, the record-keeper is entitled to invoke fifth
amendment protection.
86. Id. at 124.
87. Id. at 124-25. See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 380.
88. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Schmerber involved the analysis of petitioner's blood sample,
which was drawn over his objection, after his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol.
The Court declined to extend protection of the privilege to the taking of the blood sample,
stating that the blood test "although an incriminating act of compulsion, was neither peti-
tioner's testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing" and thus was
not privileged. Id. at 765.
89. Id. at 761.
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compelled.90 The privilege against self-incrimination reaches the
accused's communications whatever form they take.9' Such commu-
nications may consist of assertive conduct as well as oral or written
verbal statements.9 2
The Court distinguished compelled assertive conduct from
"compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or
physical evidence,' ""i which does not violate the right against self-
incrimination. For example, the Court has held that compelled
production of blood samples, 4 handwriting,95 voice exemplars9 or
participation in a line-up 97 are merely presentations of evidence for
identification which do not warrant fifth amendment protection. In
these cases, production of evidence does not require the accused to
act and therefore does not constitute assertive conduct.
The Schmerber Court's recognition that assertive statements or
conduct in compliance with a subpoena may be testimonial in nature
has expanded the definition of incriminating testimony for fifth
amendment purposes.9 8 Therefore, it was inevitable that courts
would reconsider earlier doctrines such as the Boyd content rule.99
That reconsideration occurred in Fisher v. United States.100
90. In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 528 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc).
The term "incriminating disclosures" as used in this context refers to some communicative act
or writing. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
91. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763-64.
92. For example, some nonverbal conduct, such as pointing to identify a suspect in a
lineup is the equivalent of words, assertive in nature, and is considered a statement. Conduct
that is intended as an assertion is treated as a statement. Advisory Committee's Note on FED.R. EvID. 801(a), reprinted in J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, EVIDENCE A-88 & A-89 (5th ed.
1984). See also Couch, 409 U.S. at 328 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (the person complying withthe subpoena "implicitly testifies that the evidence he brings forth is in fact the evidence
demanded").
93. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
94. See supra note 88.
95. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1967).
96. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973).
97. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967).
98. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
99. In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d at 526-27. See also Note, U.S. v. Doe,
supra note 24, at 1028-30.
100. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). Fisher involved proceedings for enforcement of an IRS sum-
mons directed at the taxpayer's attorneys for production of accountant's records which hadbeen transferred to the attorneys in connection with an IRS investigation. The Court held that
compelled production of documents from the taxpayer's attorneys did not implicate the tax-
payer's personal fifth amendment rights. Id. at 398-401.
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2. The Testimonial Aspects of Surrendering Documents
In Fisher, the Court expressly shifted the focus of the fifth
amendment analysis from the private contents' of requested docu-
ments to the testimonial effects of the act of producing those
records.'0 ' The Fisher Court found that the act of surrendering evi-
dence in response to a subpoena had communicative aspects of its
own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced.'0° The
act of production in compliance with a subpoena may constitute a
record-custodian's personal testimony or implied admission that: 1)
the requested documents exist; 2) the custodian has possession or
control of the records; or 3) the custodian believes the records surren-
dered to be the documents described in the subpoena.' 4
However, compulsion of these implied admissions alone does
not warrant fifth amendment protection with respect to the act of
production. "[T]he Fifth Amendment does not independently pro-
scribe compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence,
but applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimo-
nial communication that is incriminating.' 0 5 Thus, the Fisher test
consists of three elements: 1) compulsion;'0 6 2) a testimonial commu-
nication which may take the form of either oral testimony, authen-
tication of the contents of documents,0 7 or an assertive act;'08 and 3)
incrimination, which results when the documents surrendered are an
important evidentiary link in the government's case.'0 9
101. See Note, U.S. v. Doe, supra note 24, at 1030.
102. 425 U.S. at 409-10. The Court stressed that the fifth amendment "protects against
compelled self-incrimination, not the disclosure of private information." See also In re Grand
Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d at 527-28.
103. 425 U.S. at 410.
104. Id. at 410, 412. See also Curcio, 354 U.S. at 125; United States v. Ghidoni, 732
F.2d 814 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984). In Ghidoni, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit applied the testimonial communications rule as interpreted in Fisher. Petitioner was ac-
cused of tax evasion and sought to invoke the fifth amendment to avoid production of bank
records. The court held that signing a directive authorizing a bank to disclose records was not
testimonial as it did not imply that the records existed, but only that if they existed they would
be surrendered. Id. at 817-18.
105. 425 U.S. at 408 (emphasis original). See also California v. Buyers, 402 U.S. 424,
429 (1971) (plurality held that in order to invoke the fifth amendment it "is necessary to show
that compelled disclosures will confront the claimant with substantial hazards of self-incrimi-
nation"). See generally Note, United States v. Fox: The Fifth Amendment Shields a Sole
Proprietor From Producing Business Records Pursuant to IRS Summons, 38 ARK. L. REV.
670, 681-86 (1985).
106. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
107. 425 U.S. at 408-09.
108. Id. See also supra note 30, 92.
109. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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3. United States v. Doe: A Departure from the Collective En-
tity Rule
Fisher's classification of the act of production as "testimonial"
was reaffirmed in United States v. Doe,"' where the testimonial
communications theory was applied to a sole proprietorship."' Doe
confirmed the Court's departure from the Boyd content analysis by
finding that the fifth amendment's focus is compelled self-incrimina-
tion, " 2 not protection of privacy, which is merely incidental to the
fifth amendment privilege." 8 The Court explained that business
records subpoenaed from a sole proprietorship are not privileged per
se; rather, it is the incriminating act of production that is privi-
leged."14 In Doe, the government had conceded that the subpoenaed
materials were or might have been incriminating;.. 5 therefore, the
Court held the proprietorship's record-keeper could not be compelled
to produce business records without a grant of statutory use
immunity." 6
Consequently, the Court's application of the testimonial com-
munications test in Doe has called the status of the collective entity
rule into question."' Under traditional collective entity analysis, a
sole proprietorship would be treated as an individual with the right
to assert a fifth amendment claim to avoid producing private, per-
sonal documents."' However, the Doe Court expressly excluded
privacy from fifth amendment protection, thereby eliminating an im-
portant element of the collective entity test." 9 Yet, the Doe decision
does not expressly state that the collective entity rule is superseded
by the testimonial communications rule, and, given the significance
of the issue, it may be unreasonable to assume the Doe Court implic-
110. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
111. Id. at 611-12. See supra note 4.
112. See Note, U.S. v. Doe, supra note 24, at 1030 n.56, 1033.
113. Id.
114. 465 U.S. at 612-13.
115. Id. at 607-08.
116. Id. at 616-17. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d at 530 (Becker, J., concur-
ring); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143, 147 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985); In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52,
57-59 (2d Cir. 1985).
118. See White, 322 U.S. at 702; Wilson, 221 U.S. at 382-85. See also Note, U.S. v.
Doe, supra note 24, at 1035. See supra notes 4 & 15 and accompanying text.
119. 465 U.S. at 611-12 & n.10 (rejects privacy as a basis for finding the requested
records to be privileged and quotes with approval a lower court's observation that recent deci-
sions "have stripped the content of business records of any Fifth Amendment protection." Id.
at 612 n.10). See Note, U.S. v. Doe, supra note 24, at 1035.
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itly intended such a replacement. 120 This uncertainty regarding the
scope of the Doe decision has resulted in conflicting lower court deci-
sions addressing the question of fifth amendment rights with respect
to business records.
IV. RECENT APPLICATIONS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
PRIVILEGE
A. The Testimonial Communications Rule is Limited to Sole
Proprietorships
The confusion as to when fifth amendment protection may be
invoked is reflected in the Sixth Circuit's sharply divided decision in
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern).1"' In that case, the
majority adopted a strict interpretation of the collective entity rule,
while the dissent took the opposite view that the testimonial commu-
nications test should apply.
The majority adhered to the view that an individual cannot rely
on the fifth amendment privilege to avoid producing a collective en-
tity's records which he holds in a representative capacity, "even if
those records might incriminate him personally."12 The court rea-
soned that since a custodian of corporate or partnership records acts
only in a representative capacity, production of the records is not a
testimonial act warranting protection by the privilege against self-
incrimination. 28 The production communicates nothing more than
the fact that the person producing the records is a representative of a
business entity. 2' However, "if the government later attempts to im-
plicate [the custodian] on the basis of the act of production, . . .
120. In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae I)uces Tecum, 769 F.2d at 56.
121. 771 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985) (subpoena order-
ing the production of partnership and corporate records).
122. 771 F.2d at 145 (quoting Bet is, 417 U.S. at 88).
123. 771 F.2d at 147-48.
124. Id. at 148. Other courts which have considered the survival of the collective entity
rule have reached the same conclusion. In In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Vargas), 727 F.2d
941, 945 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984), the first post-Doe decision, the
Tenth Circuit held that an attorney holding files as a client's representative could not assert a
fifth amendment privilege. The court stated that the recent Supreme Court decisions did not
extend the privilege to records or other collective entities. Id.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit applied the collective entity rule in United States v. Malis,
737 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1984). In Malis, petitioner claimed that a partnership existed solely
as a tax reporting device for his sole practitioner law practice and attempted to invoke fifth
amendment protection to avoid producing partnership records. The court noted that tax treat-
ment is irrelevant for determining fifth amendment availability. Petitioner was acting in his
representative capacity and could not assert the fifth amendment to avoid producing the records
of a collective entity. Id.
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[s]uch proof would seek to add testimonial value to the otherwise
testimony-free act of production." '125 Thus, the majority found there
were no testimonial aspects to an agent's compelled disclosure of cor-
porate records.
The majority concluded that despite the shift in emphasis from
the privacy interest in the contents of subpoenaed documents to the
testimonial act of production, the testimonial communications rule
did not extend fifth amendment protection to the production of the
records of a corporation or other collective entity. 2 The testimonial
communications rule, in the majority's opinion, is a new limit to the
fifth amendment protection of natural persons who are compelled to
produce non-oral evidence.'1 7 Under this view, individuals and sole
proprietorships may claim the privilege against compelled production
of documents only when the act of production is "testimonial." 2 '
This new prong of fifth amendment analysis does not apply to collec-
tive entities or their agents because such entities have no fifth
amendment rights.1" 9 Consequently, the collective entity rule pre-
vents a corporate records custodian from relying on the act of
production as a potentially incriminating act which justifies a fifth
amendment claim.' 80
In contrast, Judge Jones' dissent viewed the testimonial commu-
nications rule as a new additional application of the right against
self-incrimination, which the law did not previously recognize as be-
ing potentially testimonial."' Judge Jones argued the testimonial
communications rule established that the compelled act of producing
documents may be testimonial and self-incriminating, and is there-
fore privileged under the fifth amendment." 2 The dissent concluded
that "[i]f the act of producing documents involves compelled self-in-
crimination of the person holding the documents, the government
must either grant use immunity to the custodian of the documents or
125. 771 F.2d at 148 (quoting Schlansky, 709 F.2d at 1083).
126. 771 F.2d at 145.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 147-48.
129. Id. at 146 (citing In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 8, 1983, 722 F.2d 294(6th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed sub nom. Butcher v. United States, 465 U.S. 1085 (1984)). In
that case, appellant was subpoenaed to produce the financial records of eight companies. The
district court refused to consider in camera, an affidavit explaining why the act of production
would be testimonial and incriminating. The court held that the act of producing the records of
an entity merely acknowledges that the subpoenant believes that the requested corporate docu-
ments exist. 771 F.2d at 146.
130. 771 F.2d at 147.
131. Id. at 148-49 (Jones, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 148.
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forego compelling him to produce them."'33 Thus, the dissent looked
to a corporate record-keeper's personal rights, while the Sixth
Circuit's majority focused on the nature of the entity involved, to
determine if fifth amendment protection was available.
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Sixth Circuit's majority in
In re Grand Jury Subpoena (85-W-71-5)."" In that case, an attor-
ney was subpoenaed to surrender corporate records which were
given to her by her client, a former corporate officer. The court
found that production of corporate records by the officer or his attor-
ney was an action taken in the client's representative capacity as
either a former officer, or trustee, of the now defunct corporation,
not as an individual. 85 Accordingly, the court held that the records
must be produced because the act of production is not testimonial
unless the government attempts to use the surrendered evidence
against the corporate officer.'
3 6
The Eleventh Circuit also followed the Sixth Circuit's lead in
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Ackerman).' That case
involved a grand jury investigation of the pharmaceutical corporation
of which appellant and his brother were officers and the sole
shareholders. Appellant attempted to invoke his right against self-
incrimination after being served with a subpoena addressed to the
corporate records custodian. The court stated that the Doe decision
was expressly limited to the business records of a sole proprietorship
and held that appellant could not invoke the fifth amendment to
withhold the documents of a collective entity which are held in his
representative capacity.' 38
Thus, the Sixth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits cling to the
traditional collective entity theory. These courts view the right
against self-incrimination as a personal privilege which is unavaila-
ble to corporations and individuals acting on behalf of corporations.
B. Subpoenants Who are Personally Incriminated are Entitled to
Fifth Amendment Protection
Similarly, the Second Circuit distinguished the fifth amendment
treatment of corporations from that of sole proprietorships in In re
133. Id. at 149.
134. 784 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1986).
135. Id. at 861.
136. d. (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d at 148).
137. 795 F.2d 904 (11th Cir. 1986).
138. Id. at 905-06.
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Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum.139 The Second Circuit
court's test for invoking fifth amendment protection depends upon
the identity of the subpoenant. 40 In the case where a corporation is
the subpoenant, the court reasoned that the record-keeper does not
attest to his personal possession of subpoenaed records, but to their
existence and possession by the corporation. 4 Conversely, when an
individual is personally compelled to produce corporate documents,
fifth amendment protection is available if the act of production
would result in self-incrimination. 42
The court noted that neither Fisher nor Doe expressly overruled
the collective entity rule, 48 and concluded that "[t]here is simply no
situation in which the fifth amendment would prevent a corporation
from producing corporate records, for the corporation itself has no
fifth amendment privilege."'" The corporation has a continuing ob-
ligation to comply with a subpoena even if its records custodian
would be personally incriminated by producing the requested evi-
dence.' 4 However, the court indicated that the custodian need not
surrender the documents personally. If the record-keeper would be
incriminated by producing the requested documents, the corporation
should simply appoint another representative to produce them. 4"
Even if the custodian was entitled to fifth amendment protection, the
privilege does not protect the custodian from another employee's pro-
duction of the records., 47 Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that
the requested documents must be surrendered because the subpoena
in In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae was directed at the corporation
and not the record-keeper or another specified individual.' 48
The court examined the application of this test in a prior deci-
sion 49 where the government was prevented from compelling a
139. 769 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1985) (involved a custodian of subpoenaed documents who
was the majority shareholder, sole operating officer, and director of a corporation which had
only three shareholders).
140. Id. at 59.
141. Id. at 57.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 57-59.
144. Id. at 57 (quoting United States v. Barth, 745 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1984)).
145. 769 F.2d at 57.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 59.
149. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 722 F.2d 981, 986 (2d Cir. 1983). The
former president of a corporation retained certain corporate records after leaving its employ-
ment. The former president was the target of a grand jury investigation of alleged fraud in the
corporation's financial statements which were filed under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act. Id.
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former officer from producing corporate records which he had taken
without authorization.150 In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Te-
cum, the subpoenant's production of the requested records clearly
qualified as testimony incriminating him for having taken those
records."5 Under the Second Circuit's test, the officer was no longer
a corporate representative and only he could produce the records;
therefore he was entitled to fifth amendment protection. "2
The Second Circuit reaffirmed its view in In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas Issued to Thirteen Corporations,' " where the appellee
sought to invoke the fifth amendment to avoid producing documents
of thirteen corporations which were suspected of issuing fraudulent
invoices to the target of a grand jury investigation. The appellee
claimed that since the government had little knowledge about the
corporations' records, his production of records would be testimonial
in nature and could incriminate him. "4 The appellee further argued
that recent dissolution of the corporations had eliminated the option
of appointing another agent, who would not be incriminated, to com-
ply with the subpoenas.'55 However, the subpoenas were directed at
the corporations, not the appellee. Therefore, the corporation was
required to provide representatives or outside agents to comply with
the government's demands.' Thus, the Second Circuit has consist-
ently held that corporations and their agents are not entitled to fifth
amendment protection where compulsion is directed at the
corporation.
The Fourth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit's approach in
United States v. Lang.' 7 In Lang, the president of a corporation
who was also a 50% shareholder, was under investigation by the IRS
for diverting corporate funds into his personal account. The IRS is-
sued a summons to the corporate president for corporate records, and
150. 769 F.2d at 59.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 775 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1985). Pursuant to a grand jury investigation of possible tax
evasion and other offenses, the grand jury issued subpoenas duces tecum to thirteen corpora-
tions. Petitioner was connected to the corporations through bank records and acted as a repre-
sentative of several of the corporations. Id.
154. Id. at 45. See supra note 41.
155. 775 F.2d at 47.
156. Id. at 48. The court stated that "[tihe principals involved in these corporations
have received the benefits of the corporate form and they must also accept its obligations. ...
A contrary holding would allow a corporation, whose controlling figures had involved it in
criminal activity to avoid production of corporate documents by virtue of that criminal-
ity .. " Id.
157. 792 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1986).
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the president sought to avoid production by invoking the fifth
amendment. The court found that this was not "a case where the
custodian [was] automatically incriminated by demonstrating his
knowledge or control of the records .. .nor [was] this a case in
which the government was clearly subpoenaing the records to have
the custodian .. .authenticate them through production."'88 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that enforcement of the summons would not
violate the president's fifth amendment rights.
The court stated that even in rare circumstances where produc-
tion of corporate documents amounts to testimonial incrimination,
the basic rule of Bellis continues after Doe, and a corporate repre-
sentative or agent cannot claim a fifth amendment privilege." 9 The
individual has a personal fifth amendment privilege, but the corpora-
tion must comply with the summons through some other person.
C. The Testimonial Communications Rule Provides Equal Treat-
ment for All Record-Keepers
Only the Third Circuit has found that the Supreme Court deci-
sions 6 ° afford identical protection to corporate records custodians
and other record-keepers for fifth amendment purposes. In In re
Grand Jury Matter (Brown), the Third Circuit's majority reconciled
its view with the collective entity rationale by reasoning that the col-
lective entity test relates only to the contents of documents. 6 Under
this theory, a records custodian is denied fifth amendment protection
only with respect to the incriminating contents of an entity's docu-
ments." 2 The court explained that prior Supreme Court decisions
implementing the collective entity rule did not consider the often
communicative and incriminating act of production." 3 Thus, the tes-
timonial act of production theory does not supersede or conflict with
the collective entity rule.
The court applied the testimonial communications test in In re
Grand Jury Matter (Brown), stating that the government cannot
compel a corporate records custodian to produce corporate records if
the act of production would personally incriminate him."" Accord-
158. d. at 1241-42.
159. Id. at 1240-41.
160. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 85; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 391; Doe, 465 U.S. at 605.
161. 768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985) (the sole shareholder of a professional corporation
was subpoenaed to produce corporate records and testify to their authenticity).
162. d. at 528.
163. Id. at 528 n.2.
164. Id.
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ingly, the Third Circuit held that authentication of subpoenaed
records could not be compelled because the lower court failed to ei-
ther allow petitioner to establish that production and authentication
would cause self-incrimination, or to grant him statutory use
immunity. 60
Judge Becker's concurring opinion rejected the majority's posi-
tion that collective entity custodians have fifth amendment rights
identical to those of non-collective entity custodians. 6 ' Like the
Sixth and Fourth circuits, the concurrence argued that the policy of
the collective entity rule, which is against allowing corporate custodi-
ans to protect the corporation from disclosure, survives the
emergence of the testimonial communications rule. 67 Judge Becker's
test for fifth amendment protection is based upon the nature of evi-
dence requested and the entity involved.' 6 Under the Becker test,
non-collective entity custodians can claim a fifth amendment privi-
lege with respect to both oral testimony and the act of production,
but collective entity custodians can claim the privilege only with re-
spect to oral testimony.' 69 Thus, in accordance with the traditional
collective entity rationale, a corporate records custodian, by accepting
his corporate position, is deemed to have waived fifth amendment
protection for testimonial incrimination inherent in the act of
production.17 0
Judge Garth's dissent favors an even more strict interpretation
of the traditional collective entity rule.' 7 ' The dissent noted that a
long line of cases has established that collective entity custodians are
not entitled to any fifth amendment protection with respect to corpo-
rate records.'7 Judge Garth stated the real issue was whether a
one-man corporation should be treated as a sole proprietorship, or a
corporation with respect to fifth amendment rights.'M The dissent
concluded that until the Supreme Court explicitly rules otherwise, a
corporation should be treated as a collective entity regardless of its
size. ' 74
The majority view in Brown also prevailed in a subsequent
165. Id. at 529.
166. Id. at 530 (Becker, J., concurring).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 530-31 n.3.
169. Id. at 530.
170. Id. See White, 322 U.S. at 699; Wilson, 221 U.S. at 378-79.
171. 768 F.2d at 532 (Garth, J., dissenting).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 539-40.
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case. In re Grand Jury Empanelled 3-23-83"" involved a grand
jury investigation of a conspiracy to defraud insurance companies by
submitting false medical treatment reports in support of insurance
claims. Appellant, an attorney, was held in contempt of court for
refusing to produce the records of a medical corporation. The court
held that "the custodian of corporate records who is subpoenaed to
produce them cannot be held in contempt for failure to do so if he
demonstrates that such production would in fact tend to incriminate
him."' 6 Thus, the Third Circuit has adopted a liberal view of fifth
amendment treatment by extending the right against self-incrimina-
tion to records custodians of all business entities.
V. THE NEED FOR CONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
The foregoing discussion illustrates the lower courts' search for
a convincing rationale for fifth amendment protection with respect to
business documents. 177 The collective entity rule represents the long-
standing proposition that the right against self-incrimination should
not be extended to individuals so as to allow collective entities, such
as corporations, to shield their records from governmental scrutiny.
However, the testimonial communications rule protects an individual
against compelled self-incrimination despite his status as a corporate
agent. The Supreme Court must resolve the tension between these
175. 773 F.2d 45 (3d Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
176. Id. at 47.
177. One lower court interpreted the conflict between the Sixth and Third circuits as
follows:
Notwithstanding the apparent disagreement between the Third and Sixth cir-
cuits as to whether Doe's "act-of-production" doctrine applies to [a collective
entity's record custodian], it is significant that the Sixth Circuit tempered its
holding - that no such privilege existed - by noting that [a subsequent gov-
ernmental attempt to use the act of production against the custodian would
make the act testimonial]. . . .Thus, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, though not
requiring a grant of immunity prior to the production of corporate records by
an individual custodian, would limit the risk of production with a promise of de
facto use immunity in any subsequent criminal prosecution of the custodian.
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated January 30, 1986, 638 F. Supp. 794, 800
(D. Me. 1986) (emphasis added).
See also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Ackerman), 795 F.2d 904 (11th Cir.
1986), where the Eleventh Circuit attempted to distinguish the Third Circuit's decision in In
re Grand Jury Matter (Brown). The court stated that Ackerman was plainly acting in a
representative capacity as a custodian of the corporation's documents, whereas the individual
subpoenaed in Brown was an accountant who had incorporated his one-man practice.
"Whether an individual operating under such a business structure would be considered as
holding documents in a personal or representative capacity we need not now decide." Id. at
907.
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two policies if fifth amendment protection is to be applied uniformly
in the lower courts.
The collective entity rule, as indicated in Figure 1 below, is
skewed in favor of the- government's regulatory interests.
COLLECTIVE ENTITY TEST
PRONG I
WHO IS BEING COMPELLED TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE?
NO FIFTH NO FIFTH
AMENDMENT AMENDMENT
RIGHT RIGHT
PRONG 3
IS VERBAL DISCLOSURE THE WITNESS HAS A FIFTH
COMPELLED? AMENDMENT RIGHT, BUT MAY
BE COMPELLED TO PRODUCE
THE EVIDENCE IF AN ORDER
FOR STATUTORY IMMUNITY
NO YES ISSUES.
NO FIFTH
AMENDMENT
RIGHT
THE ENTITY MUST
APPOINT ANOTHER
AGENT TO PRODUCE
THE REQUESTED
DOCUMENTS
FIGURE I
This approach fails to adequately acknowledge that disclosure of
corporate information could jeopardize the personal rights and civil
liberties of record-keepers who are compelled to surrender the re-
quested information. The collective entity rule does not consider the
possibility that a record-keeper may be personally incriminated by
the compelled act of producing evidence, 178 and ignores the fact that
compelled disclosure can incriminate a person regardless of his status
as a sole proprietor or corporate employee. The rule does, however,
recognize a custodian's personal fifth amendment privilege to refuse
178. Figure 1 (prong 3). See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
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to orally authenticate subpoenaed documents if authentication would
result in self-incrimination."' Thus, under the collective entity rule,
a record-keeper may assert a fifth amendment claim only if com-
pelled to make a verbal disclosure which would personally incrimi-
nate him.
In contrast, the testimonial communications rule illustrated in
Figure 2 reflects the fact that collective entities consist of individuals
who hold personal constitutional rights.' 80
TESTIMONIAL COMMUNICATIONS TEST
PRONG I
DOES PRODUCING THE REQUESTED INFORMATION CONSTITUTE A
TESTIMONIAL COMMUNICATION?
PRONG 2 RIGHT
DOES THE EVIDENCE TEND TO
PERSONALLY INCRIMINATE THE
WITNESS?
THE WITNESS HAS A FIFTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT. BUT MAY
BE COMPELLED TO SURRENDER
THE EVIDENCE IF AN ORDER
FOR STATUTORY USE IMMUNITY
ISSUES.
FIGURE 2
The testimonial communications test focuses on the impact that dis-
closure will have upon the individual who is compelled to surrender
the requested information. s' The testimonial communications rule
179. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
180. Figure 2 (prong 2). See supra text accompanying notes 88-92.
181. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
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differs from the collective entity rule in two important respects: 1)
the testimonial communications rule looks beyond business form to
the impact that a compelled disclosure will have on the specific em-
ployee who must surrender the evidence;182 and 2) the testimonial
communications test includes assertive conduct, such as the act of
producing evidence, in the definition of testimony.'
The emergence of the testimonial communications test under-
cuts the proposition that fifth amendment protection turns on the
nature of entity involved. In a series of recent decisions, the Supreme
Court found the testimonial nature of evidence to be the basis for
asserting the privilege against self-incrimination. 84 The Schmerber
decision essentially redefined what constitutes testimony for fifth
amendment purposes.' 85 In Schmerber, the Court expanded the
scope of the right against self-disclosure to include any compelled
testimonial communication which threatens to incriminate an indi-
vidual.' 86 The Fisher Court then announced that the act of
producing subpoenaed documents falls within the definition of a
"testimonial communication and is privileged."' 87 Finally, Doe rep-
resents the Court's first application of the testimonial communica-
tions theory in a business setting.'88 These decisions demonstrate the
transition to greater recognition of a record-keeper's individual
rights.
However, this trend does not mean the testimonial communica-
tions approach supersedes the collective entity theory; these two
approaches are not mutually exclusive. The fact that a corporation
has no fifth amendment rights does not necessarily deprive the en-
tity's employees of their personal fifth amendment rights.'8 The test
set forth below combines the beneficial aspects of the collective entity
and testimonial communications rules, resulting in a more equitable
approach to fifth amendment analysis.
VI. PROPOSAL: EQUAL TREATMENT FOR ALL BUSINESS RECORD
CUSTODIANS
The proposed test for fifth amendment protection reflects the
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
184. Figure 2 (prong 1).
185. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
186. Id. "
187. Id. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
188. See supra text accompanying note 114.
189. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
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Third Circuit's view190 that the testimonial communications analysis
is applicable to both collective entity and non-collective entity record-
keepers, and incorporates the Second Circuit's distinction between
collective entity and non-collective entity subpoenants.1 'O The right
against self-incrimination is a fundamental right which transcends a
person's status as a corporate officer or employee. Business form
should not be the deciding factor of fifth amendment availability.
Rather, fifth amendment protection should be triggered when
compelled production of information constitutes a testimonial com-
munication which tends to personally incriminate the subpoenant 1 2
As Figure 3 indicates, the first step of the proposed test is iden-
tification of the party who is subject to governmental compulsion.1 93
190. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 139-48 and accompanying text.
192. See supra text accompanying note 164.
193. Figure 3 (prong 1).
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PROPOSED SOLUTION
PRONG I
WHO IS BEING COMPELLED TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE?
ICORPORATION IL CUSTODIAN
PRONG 2
DOES PRODUCING THE REQUESTED INFORMATION CONSTITUTE A
TESTIMONIAL COMMUNICATION?
N O E 3
NO YES 
FYES
NO PiFTH NO
AMENDMENT AMEN
RIGHT RI
PRONG 3 PRONG 3
CAN THE ENTITY APPOINT DOES THE EVIDEN
AN AGENT, WHO WILL NOT TO PERSONALLY I]
BE INCRIMINATED, TO NATE THE WITNFE
PRODUCE THE EVIDENCE?
THE WITNESS HAS A FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT, BUT
MAY BE COMPELLED TO SURRENDER THE EVIDENCE
IF AN ORDER FOR STATUTORY IMMUNITY ISSUES.
FIGURE 3
This identification is important at the outset of the analysis because
a corporate subpoenant has flexibility to select an employee or agent
to act on its behalf,194 whereas a records custodian who is subpoe-
naed must personally surrender the requested documents. 9 '
After identifying the subpoenant, the court must determine
whether that party's surrender of the requested information consti-
tutes a testimonial communication.' 96 If the surrender does not
involve an assertive statement or assertive conduct, the witness may
not invoke the fifth amendment privilege to avoid producing the re-
quested information. Conversely, if production constitutes a testimo-
nial communication, the court must advance to the next prong of the
194. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
196. Figure 3 (prong 2).
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GHT
[CE TEND
NCRIMI-
tS?
AMENDMENT
RIGHT
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analysis.
The third prong reflects the fact that collective entities have no
fifth amendment rights, and provides slightly different treatment de-
pending upon the identity of the subpoenant. If a corporate records
custodian is personally subpoenaed and would be personally incrimi-
nated by producing the requested evidence, the government cannot
compel production without a grant of statutory use immunity. 197
However, when the corporation is subpoenaed and the records custo-
dian would be personally incriminated by producing subpoenaed
documents, the corporation must attempt to appoint another repre-
sentative to produce the requested information. 98 If no agent or
employee of the organization can produce the information without
being personally incriminated,"' the person in possession of the doc-
uments may invoke his right against self-incrimination, and the gov-
ernment can only compel production by granting use immunity to
that individual. 200
Use immunity allows the government to obtain records required
for regulatory purposes without compelling the records custodian to
incriminate himself.201 Similarly, directing compulsion at the corpo-
ration rather than a specific individual allows the entity to appoint
an agent, who will not be personally incriminated, to surrender re-
quested information. 02 Thus, the government's need for regulatory
information can be satisfied without invading the record-keeper's
right against self-incrimination.
VII. CONCLUSION
The right against self-incrimination has historically been denied
to business record-keepers acting on behalf of a collective entity. A
corporate agent may not withhold records on the grounds that his
corporation may be incriminated - the purpose of the fifth amend-
ment is to protect individuals from self-incrimination. Accordingly,
early courts were hesitant to recognize the personal rights of
corporate agents for fear that such recognition would shield the cor-
poration from regulation. More recent decisions reflect the analytical
changes necessary to reconcile this conflict between the right against
197. Id. (prong 3).
198. Id. See supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
199. For example, a corporation consisting of a sole practitioner would be compelled to
personally produce the requested information.
200. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
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self-incrimination and the government's regulatory interests. The eq-
uitable resolution to this problem is to grant fifth amendment
protection to any individual who may be personally incriminated by
a compelled disclosure. The testimonial communications rule pro-
vides a mechanism whereby the government can execute its regula-
tory duties without overriding the personal rights of corporate
agents.
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